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Abstract 
The article analyses whether the first four years of EU membership had a tangible 
impact on Estonian party politics. In particular, the article argues that in small countries 
the EU perspectives and European Policy Specialists (EPS) may remain sidelined in 
the decision making processes within political parties merely due to mechanical effects 
of small numbers of EPSs. 
 
The creation and expansion of the European Union (EU) has perhaps been the most 
important political development in Europe during the past half a century. After re-gaining 
independence, joining the EU was without doubt the main political and economic change for 
Estonia. Therefore, one could predict that membership would have led to changes in 
national politics, beside more immediate effects on the country’s economy. However, the 
experience of old member states shows that despite substantial delegated powers, the EU 
has only modestly influenced national party competition – especially directly regarding the 
power of the European issue itself for structuring domestic party competition.1 This article 
analyses whether the first four years of EU membership had a tangible impact on Estonian 
party politics – in areas covered in earlier studies more (party organisation and policy space) 
or less (party system and the role of new EU-politicians) deeply. Whereas the primary focus 
of the article is Estonia, the respective developments in neighbouring Latvia are briefly 
discussed in parts of the article as a first-hand check on the plausibility of arguments based 
on Estonian evidence. In particular, the article assesses the question whether in small 
countries the EU perspectives and European Policy Specialists (EPS) may remain sidelined 
in the decision making processes within political parties merely due to mechanical effects of 
small numbers of EPSs. Poguntke et al have argued that: 
 
“… the expectation that additional resources will strengthen the intraparty power 
of EU specialists is likely to be more realistic in large parties in large countries, as 
such parties will have organisations that are sufficiently large to enable 
specialisation and facilitate the redistribution of resources in favour of a specific 
group of party actors. Clearly, a considerable number of parties within EU 
Member States will simply be too small for such a re-allocation of resources to be 
an option. [The] argument about EU specialists presupposes a degree of 
organisational differentiation that will be absent in many smaller countries (and 
smaller parties in large countries), where it is more realistic to expect that party 
elites will double as EU specialists.”2 
 
This article essentially confirms the assertion but goes beyond a simple statement in 
assessing the anatomy of the phenomenon. 
 
1 
Direct effects of EU membership on Estonian party politics are virtually non-existent, 
similarly to the experience of older member states of Western Europe and earlier evidence 
from new member states of Central and Eastern Europe.3 The exit from the EU or significant 
opt-outs are not a realistic option and are not advocated by any significant actors. 
Repercussions of an exit from the EU would likely be economically and politically very costly 
and that is well understood. This is hardly surprisingly given that the popular support for the 
membership increased strikingly in the wake of accession. At the same time, the impact of 
Estonian parties and politicians on the EU policies is or is perceived to be marginal. Even 
though party programs usually argue vaguely that Estonia should be an “active member” of 
the EU and look carefully after its interests, there are no clear ideas how the country could 
gain more — or any real —leverage in the European policy process. Generally, Estonia is 
seen to be an EU policy-taker rather than an EU policy-maker. However, there are 
interesting fields where parties see opportunities or missions at the EU level – such as 
pushing for more market liberalism based on the country’s experience of successful 
economic reforms or being actively engaged in EU’s neighbourhood policy towards former 
Soviet Union countries. Despite occasional rhetorical optimism, the jury is still out on the 
question whether Estonian government or its six MEPs can have any influence on these 
issues. Some other issues related to EU that have caused some domestic political debate – 
such as levy on excess stocks of sugar, common energy policy and the use of European 
funds – but none of them has had the potential to spark a new party, generate a faction 
within an existing one or significantly restructure the competition among the existing parties.  
Therefore, most of this article focuses on three dimensions of indirect impact of EU 
membership: effects on the party system and patterns of competition, impact on intra-party 
distribution of power (including the role of the MEPs) and possible policy constraints on 
feasible domestic policy options. We analyse the failure to introduce the common currency 
as a critical case study where one could have expected strict constraints – the introduction of 
the Euro being a condition of membership – but nevertheless the country did not manage to 
introduce it during the first four years of membership. 
 
Content. First we analyse the presence of EU-related issues in party programs and assess 
whether the positions may have structured the party system, however subtly. We will be 
looking at indicators in public opinion surveys from 2004 and 2007 and will assess the EU 
element in their 2003 and 2007 national election manifestos. Even though the 2007 election 
coincided with a set deadline for introduction of the Euro, it was not a significant topic in the 
campaign. While it was discussed to some extent, it failed to be decisive or even distinguish 
parties in a run up to elections. Even if the EU itself or the EU policies did not make it to the 
main agenda, the membership sparked new topics or changed the context of others that 
would have likely not entered the agenda otherwise. Such topics include worker migration to 
old member states (mostly to Finland) that has raised specific concerns – such as real or 
potential shortages of doctors, nurses, bus drivers and construction workers, i.e. in sectors 
that have been more affected by more open borders. Other issues that would have mattered 
regardless of membership have clearly acquired a different context. For example, the matter 
of energy security has assumed a distinct EU twist – both in terms of Common Energy Policy 
and membership obligations that lead to problems with oil shale mining in Estonia and 
closing of the Ignalina nuclear plant in Lithuania in 2009.4 Also, regional development, 
infrastructure projects and agriculture have been discussed with frequent references to 
European structural funds. Yet, it is remarkable that the EU is usually seen as an 
organisation that poses constraints (e.g. oil shale) or creates opportunities (e.g. structural 
funds) rather than an arena of active policy formation. Foreign and energy policy seem to be 
the only real exceptions. 
 
Competition. Membership in the EU may have an effect on party system by changing 
patterns of competition and impact on individual parties by creating new sources of influence 
(e.g. MEPs) and changing the distribution of power among erstwhile actors. Electoral 
systems are known to have impact on party systems starting from Maurice Duverger.5 Two 
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factors are related to the European Parliament elections. First, as different electoral systems 
are used than in national elections, they are bound to lead to somewhat different outcomes 
and may restructure party systems. Secondly, a European Parliament election in itself adds 
an event to electoral calendar and provides opportunities and risks for political parties. It has 
a potential to change party system by bringing in new players, strengthening or weakening 
others and changing party elites – some take up new positions and others may acquire an 
aura of a winner or a loser. Also, the EU politicians from Estonia acquire a novel role in 
national politics and European affiliation of parties may have an effect on the parties 
themselves. 
 
Constraints. It can be argued that globalization in general and the EU in particular constrains 
feasible policy options of national actors.6 Implementing the acquis communautaire and 
meeting Luxembourg criteria set their constraints before accession. While it is difficult to 
imagine what Estonian politics would look like if the country did not enter the EU, Estonian 
politics without the existence of the EU is simply unimaginable. That is certainly different in 
most old member states, where democratic national politics had existed some time before 
the EU came around. Yet, some new and tangible constraints are posed on policies by the 
requirement to introduce the Euro and fulfil the corresponding Maastricht criteria. This article 
argues that rather lax deadlines combined with domestic opportunism, difficulty of controlling 
inflation through policies and the lack of popular enthusiasm for the common currency leave 
room for independent macroeconomic policies. Yet again, it is difficult to speculate about the 
range of policy options if the EU and European Monetary Union simply were not there. 
This categorization of EU impacts used here is not an attempt to propose a better or more 
comprehensive classification for the effects of Europeanization than has been proposed 
before, for example by Robert Ladrech.7 The categorization is used here for structuring the 
exploratory rather than strictly hypothesis-testing discussion of the Estonian case. Ladrech 
singles out five areas where the membership in the EU may affect political parties: 
policy/programmatic content, organization, patterns of party competition, party-government 
relations, and relations beyond the national party system. “Content” and “competition” match 
categories proposed here but “constraints” do not fall easily into Ladrech’s areas. While it 
addresses parties’ policy orientations, it does not refer directly to their positions on the EU 
itself or EU policies but to other fields where membership poses constraints. 
 
Party Positions on the EU and the EU in Party Manifestos 
Support for EU membership increased substantially in Estonia during the first four years 
after accession. While in September 2003 the support for membership was 63 percent 
resulting in a 67 percent support at the accession referendum, it surpassed 70 percent in 
July 2006 and 80 percent in May 2007 (see Figure 1). The support for the introduction of 
Euro lagged behind, lingering at around 40 percent during 2006, but increasing to 47 in May 
2007 – surpassing the figure for the opposed for the first time since September 2005 when 
the survey data has become available. In the following sections, we analyse the partisan 
dimensions in support for EU membership. 
  
[FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Since accession, there has been relatively little disagreement among parliamentary parties 
about the overall stance on the EU. The ratification of Constitutional Treaty in 2006 was a 
relatively subdued affair8 and the debate on the ratification of Lisbon Treaty went even less 
noticed. As often noted, party-based Euroscepticism in Estonia has either been soft or the 
preserve of marginal political parties.9 Figure 2 shows the mean self-placement of main party 
supporters and non-voters regarding further EU integration from election surveys conducted 
in 2004 and 2007.10 Remarkably, in 2007, the means for five of the six parties were all mildly 
positive and within one tenth of the scale. With the exception of People’s Union (PU), no 
significant changes occurred after the European Parliament elections – neither in the mean 
placement of party supporters nor their deviation from party means. The latter is still 
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universally high – i.e. the views of particularly party’s voters have not become more uniform, 
and are still rather widespread and the parties thus barely distinguishable from each other.  
 
[FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Note that Figure 2 does not seem to match the general increase in support for the EU 
membership reported in Figure 1. It is likely because the question here relates to further EU 
unification. Given the fate of Constitutional treaty and uncertainty about what further 
unification may mean, 11 it is surprising that the share of those who did not indicate their 
position remained at 15 percent of the respondents. 
 
The only party that stands out among the bunch as more critical of further unification is the 
People’s Union. There was difference in general assessment of membership – it was a good 
thing for 56 percent of People’s Union’s voters and 62 percent for supporters of other 
parties.  The party’s supporters are much more sceptical about the decisions taken by the 
EU – 41 percent trusted to some extent that the decisions were in Estonia’s interest and only 
32 percent that the decisions were in the interest of people like themselves. The 
corresponding figures for other parties’ voters were 60 and 51 percent.  
 
Even though the party mainly draws its support from rural areas and has always been softly 
Eurosceptic, the visibly decreased enthusiasm among its supporters poses a small puzzle as 
the party itself does not seem to have become more Eurosceptic. Indeed, until 2007 the 
party was in charge of the Ministry of Financial Affairs and thus responsible for and pushing 
the introduction of Euro. In 2003, their manifesto was only short of outright opposition to the 
membership – stressing the need for a fair deal, holding a referendum, taking enough time 
etc – and they fought the European elections under the slogan of defending the Estonian 
kroon. Three years on, the references to the EU in the manifesto were considerably toned 
down. For example, in 2003 the manifesto stated opposition to membership in a federal 
super-state, whereas the 2007 manifesto more modestly stated a support for the reformed 
EU as a union of sovereign states. However, most references to the EU in the 2007 
manifesto were related to the use of various EU funds in Estonia.  
 
Most of the Eurosceptic sentiment stems from its rural supporters, but the difference in the 
position of rural and urban people is lesser than that between the People’s Union and other 
main parties. Thus, the party perhaps had not come to terms with the anti-EU sentiment of 
its grassroots that might have lead to adoption of a less enthusiastic program. However, that 
would entail a significant risk of alienating its more EU-friendly supporters – there are 
segments of rural population who benefits significantly from EU agricultural funds – and 
more than a third of its voters lies at the middle-point of the scale or above. Also, its rural 
outlook may make it difficult to gain foothold in urban areas. Furthermore, if it was to adopt a 
more Eurosceptic posture, its coalition potential with more EU-friendly parties might 
decrease and alienate voters who are not enthusiastic about the EU but do not care very 
much of the issue. After all, the party has sometimes been argued to be the most reliant on 
clientelist practices in Estonia and that may increase the importance of a coalition potential – 
i.e. potential of “delivering the goods”. While the above discussion on a smaller party may 
seem too detailed, it serves the purpose of highlighting problems “serious” parties may face 
when considering adopting more Eurosceptic positions. 
 
The interrelatedness of party positions on the EU and their placement on Left-Right scale 
has been noted for several new member states12 and disconfirmed for others.13 The 
correlation in Estonia has been shown for 200414 and by 2007 the relationship between party 
supporter means had slightly increased (R2 increased from 0.43 to 0.46). However, the party 
position on EU increases only slightly with movement from Left to Right. It should be noted 
that the correlation coefficients are based on data that excludes the Independence Party –
highly Eurosceptic extreme-right (nationalist and anti-establishment) party with too small 
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electoral support to analyse its voters based on survey data. Therefore, the correlation 
presumably only holds for larger parties, while on the fringes right-wing Euroscepticism 
persists. While another rightist party – the Christian People’s Party – has been classified as 
Eurosceptic before,15 its 2007 manifesto was remarkable in not mentioning the EU at all. 
 
Based on 2007 Riigikogu election manifestos16 a similar picture emerges. Most parties are 
positively in favour of the EU membership or fully accepted it. However, the EU-related 
policies were still usually consigned to foreign policy section or under subtitles like “Estonia 
and world affairs”. Most parliamentary parties mentioned responsible or advantageous use 
of EU funds in Estonia. Four parliamentary parties outlined more detailed policies to be 
addressed at the EU level. Interestingly, they mostly addressed their “specialist” policy fields. 
Hence, the market liberal Reform party argued for fighting market distortions and liberalising 
economies. The national-conservative Pro Patria stressed the need for security and defence 
cooperation. The Social Democrats emphasised common foreign policy – possibly the 
legacy of president Toomas Hendrik Ilves who used to be a Social Democrat vice-chair of 
European Parliament’s foreign affairs committee. The Greens underscored sustainability and 
cooperation in energy policy.17 The EU policy sections of Centre Party and People’s Union 
(PU) manifestos were limited to references to support of agriculture and structural funds and 
to a vague mention of the EU enhancing Estonia’s security situation. The limited attention to 
the EU in their manifestos may reflect their less enthusiastic stance on the EU – the two 
parties have earlier been placed in the softly Eurosceptic camp.18 Striking was the virtually 
complete absence of views on EU policy in the manifesto of the Christian Democrats that 
once was a clearly Eurosceptic party. The Russian Party, the (ethnic Russian) Constitution 
Party and the Left Party all made favourable if somewhat vague mentions on the EU in their 
manifestos – the latter welcomed the EU and more integration if it was based on the Nordic 
model of welfare state (i.e. common tax policy for common social policy). The Independence 
Party stood out as the only Eurosceptic party before 2007 Riigikogu elections. The contrast 
to the rest was especially strong as it called for leaving the EU and considered the 
ratification of the Constitutional Treaty by parliament an act of high treason. Its strongly anti-
EU rhetoric only managed to mobilise the support of 0.2 per cent of the voters. 
 
Two possible explanations can be given to the mentioned relatedness of EU issues and 
foreign policy. On one hand, it may reflect inertia – EU used to be “foreign” and despite 
membership it is perceived as something on a different level. On the other hand, the foreign 
policy dimension of the EU may be the most important one for Estonian parties and/or one 
where the new member states have valuable know-how making it possible to yield some 
influence on policy outcomes. That can most easily be seen with regard to EU policies 
towards former Soviet republics. On one hand, the politicians from former communist 
countries have some in-depth knowledge about these countries and on the other hand they 
may simply care more for the fate of countries like Ukraine, Georgia, Moldova and Belarus – 
due to historical and mental ties.  
 
Impacts on Estonian Party System 
The 2004 European elections were characterised by impressive success of the Social 
Democrats that has been a modestly strong party but managed to win half of the six seats. 
Even though polls conducted immediately after the election showed increase in intention to 
vote for the party in national elections, their success failed to increase significantly their 
popularity in elections to the national parliament. Even though turnout in European 
Parliament elections was much lower than in 2007 parliamentary elections (27 and 62 per 
cent respectively), there were actually more people voting for the Social Democrats in 2004 
compared to 2007. Hence, the party’s popularity in European elections was mostly due to its 
relatively favourable views on the EU – survey evidence shows that Eurosceptic voters mere 
prone to abstain – and the personal popularity of their top candidate Toomas Hendrik Ilves. 
According to 2004 post-election survey, for two thirds of Social Democrats’ supporters, the 
candidate was more important than the party. The respective figure for other parties 
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contesting the European elections was only 38 percent. It remains surprising that the 
popularity of Ilves helped to make his party second most popular immediately after the 
elections. While the later evidence shows that such effects may not be long-lasting, the 
parties may convert its European success into domestic gains if electoral calendar were to 
be favourable. 
 
[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Beside the substantial increase in the popularity of the Reform Party and the merger of Pro 
Patria and Res Publica (RP), the major change in Estonian party system between 2007 and 
2004 was the entry of the Greens to the parliament (see Table 1).19 The initiator of the party, 
Marek Strandberg contested 2004 European elections with some success, managing to win 
more than two percent of votes as an independent candidate. While the intent was clear in 
2004, the party was officially established in late 2006 and it did not contest 2005 local 
elections. It is difficult to assess the exact impact of Strandberg’s candidacy on the party’s 
success in parliamentary election, but to a degree it was certainly positive. On one hand, it 
was a test for the upcoming party; on the other, it provided the Greens with some useful and 
relatively cheap media coverage. 
 
One effect of European Parliament election is that as an additional event it provides parties 
with opportunities to raise their profile and poses risks – for instance to make costly mistakes 
in campaigns. On the other hand, it is known from electoral system research that different 
rules per se shape party systems. In particular, it is well-established that small district 
magnitude – or more exactly effective magnitude – lead to fewer parties and is harmful for 
smaller parties. An extreme example of that is posed by first-past-the-post systems in United 
Kingdom and USA, where third parties are strongly underrepresented. Rein Taagepera has 
proposed a general formula linking magnitude and effective threshold – i.e. rough votes 
percentage that should grant a party a seat in the parliament: 
 
Te=75%/(M+1) 
 
where Te is effective threshold and M is district magnitude.20 Note that if legal electoral 
threshold is used and that is higher than Te, the former overrides the latter. 
 
In Estonian parliamentary elections, a five percent legal threshold is in use.21 In European 
parliament elections, all six MEPs are elected in a single nationwide constituency based on. 
No legal threshold is used and the magnitude yields an effective threshold of 10.7 percent. 
Therefore, a party may expect a seat only if it wins the support of slightly more than ten 
percent of voters. In principle, such a system should benefit larger parties at the expense of 
smaller ones. Besides this mechanical effect, parties that fail to win seats may risk falling 
victims to the psychological effect by losing credibility as serious contenders for office. 
 
In 2004, the effective threshold worked well, as the last party to win a seat won 10.5 per cent 
of the vote – that is very close to Te. However, large parties in terms of 2003 national 
elections failed to live up to their earlier performance. Rather, the Social Democrats shrewdly 
used Ilves’s outstanding foreign policy competence as a mean to bash competitors in Pan-
European elections to excel themselves. According to 2003 results they should have failed 
to win any seats, but managed to get three out of the six. In contrast, RP and PU, that 
should have won seats according to their 2003 results, failed to win any. The reasons are 
not of major interest here,22 but it can be argued that their failure might have accelerated the 
parties’ decline in national politics. While there are certainly many factors at play, it is striking 
that the main winner of European elections did better in 2007 parliamentary elections than in 
2003 while both of the losers in 2004 lost ground later – most notably RP that merged with 
Pro Patria before 2007 elections.23 
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Intra-Party Distribution of Power 
EU Politicians from Estonia and National Politics 
Some of the top politicians who moved to EU positions have remained only marginally active 
in domestic politics. That is clearly the case with the Estonian commissioner Siim Kallas, 
who has at times voiced his views on current issues, but mostly from a broad perspective 
and cautiously on a non-partisan basis. The involvement of MEPs in Estonian politics varies. 
Some are occasional contributors to Estonian media, while others are less active and tend to 
focus more on pan-European rather than domestic issues. It remains to be seen whether 
Estonia would see a return of EU politicians to domestic politics, for example, when the 
terms of the present European Commission and European Parliament come to an end in 
2009. 
 
At the time of writing, there has been a single but dramatic return from the European 
Parliament to national politics. Toomas Hendrik Ilves was the top candidate of Social 
Democrats in 2004 European Parliament elections who managed to win almost a third of all 
preference votes and stood behind the remarkable success of his party. In 2006, he stood 
down and was elected the president of Estonia – somewhat surprisingly as the incumbent 
Arnold Rüütel was deemed to have very good chances even five months before the 
elections.24 There are two main factors behind his success. First, the anti-Rüütel parties25 
had learned their lessons from 2001, when the lack of cooperation impeded presenting a 
common candidate to oppose Rüütel – who was controversial as he had held several high 
offices during the communist era. In 2006, the screening process of alternative candidates 
for the presidency resulted in singling out of Ilves and former parliamentary speaker Ene 
Ergma who were presented as candidates in consecutive rounds in the parliament.26 
Secondly, the European Parliament elections may have given a boost to Ilves’s chances. 
The European elections were advantageous for two reasons. On one hand, he would have 
never received that much publicity and that many votes in national elections. On the other 
hand, his qualities as a candidate – excellent record as an ambassador to the US and 
foreign minister – clearly stood out better in the context of international than national 
elections.  
 
One can argue that Ilves was a well-respected politician already before 2004, often ranking 
high in polls on most popular politicians. Thus, his impressive success in European elections 
might not have contributed crucially to his later successful bid for presidency but both might 
have resulted from his popularity. However, most of the well-respected never become 
serious and successful contenders for presidency and the sequence of events hints at 
European elections keeping Ilves constantly in the picture. If the European elections did not 
take place, he did not contest them or was not as successful, Ilves would have likely 
remained a former foreign minister and the former leader of a medium-sized party. This 
counterfactual argument highlights the potential role European elections may have played in 
helping to secure the presidency for Ilves. 
 
[TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
 
The status of MEPs and EU-specialists among Estonian parties has been moderately high. 
As of July 2007, four of the six Estonian MEPs (see Table 2) are board members of their 
respective parties. Katrin Saks was elected vice-chair of the Social Democrats in May 2005. 
The status of EU-specialists is also marked when looking at the composition of Estonian 
parliaments’ EU Affairs Committee (EAC) – four out of its fifteen members were deputy 
leaders of their parties and further three were board members as of July 2008.27 Yet, these 
figures do not show an increase compared to the composition of EAC in 2003, when the 
twelve members included a party chair, a vice-chair and four additional party board 
members. Also, party board membership in 2008 was virtually equal among EAC members 
and MPs in general (47 and 48 percent).  
7 
When we look at the issue from the perspective of party boards, the European Policy 
Specialist (EPS) hardly dominate within them. In fact, given the relatively large number of 
parties, it would even theoretically be difficult for the EPSs to have a strong position on party 
boards. Large number of parties in a country leads to high fractionalisation of the parliament 
and EAC and can also lead to fractionalised cabinet and delegation to the European 
Parliament. Smallness of a country, on the other hand, means that the parliament, its EAC 
and delegation in the European Parliament have fewer members compared to larger 
countries. Even though the decision making bodies of political parties may be smaller in a 
similar fashion, their average size in Estonia still is 18 members. Given that, the absolute 
imaginable share of MEPs among board members would approach 50 percent – only if a 
single party managed to win all Estonian seats. Hence, there are sheer numerical 
constraints on the overall influence of MEPs in party structures, complemented by physical 
factors such as the distance of Brussels and Strasbourg from Tallinn and only modest 
frequency of air traffic to Brussels.28 The more realistic mean conceivable maximum 
percentage of board seats held by EPS (based on real number of MEPs and EAC members) 
is 20 – from 5 in the PU to 33 in the Reform Party – depending on the number of MEPs and 
EAC members the party has. In reality EPSs make up on average 10 percent of party boards 
– between 0 in the Greens and 17 percent in Pro Patria & RP. When we add to the figures 
cabinet ministers – often the key EU policy makers in their areas – the maximum figure 
increases to 40 percent in the Reform Party. At the same time it is highly questionable that 
ministers attend board meetings with their EU hats firmly on. Hence, while EU-related 
positions often tend to be occupied by high-profile members of the party, the law of small 
numbers precludes the party boards to be dominated by EPSs.29 As the number of MEPs is 
very limited, policy areas covered in terms of European Parliament Committee membership 
are few. It is striking that there are no full members (i.e. only substitutes) from any Baltic 
country in three committees. Therefore, it would be unrealistic to expect active engagement 
in EU-level policy formation in many (or even most) areas in most political parties. Explicit 
positions on EU issues are taken only occasionally and the issues are usually dealt with on 
an ad hoc basis. The Foreign Policy Board of Pro Patria & RP constitutes a partial exception 
as it is a permanent body dealing with EU-related policies but as its name gives away, the 
EU only takes a second role to other foreign affairs topics. 
 
Four Estonian MEPs were involved in a controversy after 2007 parliamentary elections as 
they ran as candidates in national elections. According to the rules of the European 
Parliament the two posts cannot be held concurrently and the four publicly stated that they 
had no intention to take up the seats. All four won considerable amount of votes – for 
example, the Social Democrats’ candidates accounting for 7.5 percent of the party’s total 
vote. Three of the MEPs were successful in their “bid” for a seat but refused to take an oath. 
However, it was impossible to renounce a seat without taking it up first, but after taking an 
oath Riigikogu would have been required to ask the European Parliament to terminate their 
mandates. The issue ended up in the Supreme Court, that more than five weeks after 
elections terminated their mandates. As the first sitting of the newly-elected parliament was 
delayed by more than a month, the affair gained substantial adverse publicity and the 
integrity of the MEPs was questioned in national press. While the affair likely did some harm 
for the public image of Estonian MEPs, running in national elections without intent of taking 
up the seats cannot be ruled out in the future.30 Thus, the MEPs may interfere in national 
politics also “from afar” even if the 2007 scandal will leave bitter trails, other means of 
employing MEPs for the benefit of their parties may be invented. To conclude, party elites 
leaving for Europe may not be completely lost for small country politics. Still, they often leave 
behind vacancies – for instance, party leadership – that are filled by people who are 
different, and the importance of personalities in Estonian politics should not be 
underestimated. Furthermore, as Ilves has shown, they may return in style or exert influence 
on domestic party competition. 
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It is interesting to note that among nine Latvian MEPs there are several party leaders who 
are very active in national politics. Roberts Zīle was elected the chairman of TB/LNNK (For 
Fatherland and Freedom/Latvian National Independence Movement) in December 2006. In 
November 2007, he was strongly challenged by his fellow MEP Ģirts Valdis Kristovskis – 
who narrowly lost and left the party in February 2008 becoming one of the two main initiators 
and at the time of writing a deputy leader of a new political party (Civil Alliance). In addition, 
MEP Tatjana Ždanoka is one of the three co-chairs of PCTVL (For Human Rights in United 
Latvia). 
 
European Party Affiliations 
Table 2 listed the European affiliations of Estonian political parties alongside their 
representatives at the European Parliament. Parties that contested 2007 parliamentary 
elections have clear affiliations with European parties with only three exceptions: the 
nationalist Eurosceptic Independence Party and two ethnic Russian parties. The ELDR 
group of European Parliament has members of two Estonian parties. Despite a hypothesis 
proposed in an earlier article on Europeanization and Estonian party system,31 there is no 
evidence that the Reform and Centre parties have become closer to each other as a result of 
sharing the European parliament fraction. On the contrary, the Centre party was dropped 
from Reform-led cabinet after 2007 Riigikogu elections and relationship between the parties 
was bitter already during the run up to elections, especially after the parties supported 
opposing candidates in presidential elections. Neither is there any clear evidence of them 
converging on policies. At the same time, common membership in the European People’s 
Party may have slightly smoothed the merger of RP and Pro Patria in 2006. 
 
Much more dramatic has been the fate of Latvian delegation to the Union for Europe of the 
Nations fraction, calling into question all arguments about the consolidating effect of 
common Euro-party membership. In 2004, For Fatherland and Freedom (TB/LNNK) was the 
big winner of European elections in Latvia with 30 percent of votes (in contrast to only 5.4 
percent in 2002 parliamentary elections) and returned four members to UEN fraction. 
However, by 2008 they had no less than three different partisan affiliations – Roberts Zīle 
remained in TB/LNNK, Ģirts Valdis Kristovskis and Inese Vaidere had defected to newly 
established Civil Alliance while Guntars Krasts remained independent for the time being.32 
The membership in Euro-parties has been perhaps more significant and visible in case of 
parties not themselves represented in the European Parliament and Riigikogu, such as the 
Greens, the Left Party and Christian Democrats. As emerging or marginal parties, they have 
attempted to make use of their European contacts to acquire significance in national politics 
by signalling their feasibility as a party. 
 
The role of the Greens has been particularly interesting. Although left out halfway through 
the 2007 coalition negotiations, they were closer to the government than to the rest of 
opposition parties. That was best exemplified in Marek Strandberg’s witticism that as parts of 
the government manifesto were proposed by Greens, the party was rather in “deposition” 
than opposition.33 The Greens have liaised between the Estonian government/parliament 
and European Greens–European Free Alliance (EG-EFA), notably following the rioting in 
April 2007 after the relocation of World War II memorial. While the European Parliament 
condemned the Russian over-reaction to the events and the blockade of Estonian embassy 
in Moscow, the fifth largest EG-EFA fraction had some initial reservations.  
 
At times, the Left Party has stressed its membership in European Left Party to raise its 
domestic profile. During the 2007 parliamentary election campaign, the Christian 
Democrats34 used a prominent reference to European Christian Political Movement (ECPM) 
in its outdoor posters and web-site. Estonian Christian Democrats have been rather active in 
the movement that does not have a group in European Parliament, but is represented there 
by one of its member parties (the Dutch ChristenUnie). Its conference in 2005 took place in 
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Tallinn and Peeter Võsu of Estonian Christian Democrats served at the time as the president 
of the movement. 
 
Policy Constraints: The Case of the Euro 
In this section, we consider the issue of the Euro. The requirements for its introduction could 
pose a “new conditionality” – following the “old conditionality” of Luxembourg criteria – that 
restricts policy options governments and political parties are able to pursue. In a nutshell, it 
is argued that as the date of introduction of the common currency is partially at the discretion 
of national governments, the political parties may have opted for short-term electoral benefits 
partly at the expense of early introduction of the Euro.35 Furthermore, as inflation level (that 
has been the only obstacle to the introduction of Euro) depends on many factors, most of 
which are not easily influenced by policy decisions.  
 
For a long time, Estonia aimed to join the Euro-zone from 2007.36. The deadline was in 
power well until early 2006, was extended to 2008 by May and reference to exact “€-day” 
was eventually dropped from the National Changeover Plan in October 2006. The only 
reason behind the delay was the fact that Estonia failed to comply with Maastricht inflation 
criterion. While the country has ran budget surplus rather than deficit for years and it easily 
satisfies the government debt criterion, it has been struggling with the inflation criterion. 
Since 2004, the inflation rate has been constantly higher than the Maastricht reference 
value.37 Major contributors to high inflation levels have been fast increasing GDP – boosted 
by low European interest rates that has substantially increased borrowing from abroad – and 
increase of energy prices (see Table 3). 
 
[TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
 
The criteria for joining the Eurozone can be considered to be a “new conditionality”. Before 
accession, introduction of acquis communautaire in national legislation was a major 
constraint on government policy and more indirectly on party programs. Thus, constraints 
were there already some time before Estonia acceded to the EU. Joining the union was by 
no means inevitable, and failure to do so might even have appealed to the Eurosceptic 
sections of population, but in general governments and political parties would have faced 
serious electoral repercussions for failing to become an eligible candidate or failing the 
accede the EU. Furthermore, the diversion of investments resulting from it might have been 
fatal both to country’s economics and consequently to its government. All in all, despite 
significant levels of Euroscepticism, Estonia and other pre-2004 accession countries, the 
governments could not really risk being left out as any electoral benefits could have hardly 
overweighed the negative consequences. Thus the “elite consensus”38 was in large part a 
very calculated position. 
 
The issue of the Euro is in some ways similar to the one of accession – joining the EMU has 
been a stated aim of all governments and most political parties have not voiced significant 
objections to it. As later membership in the EMU was a precondition of joining the EU, the 
five macroeconomic criteria39 can be considered to constitute remarkable constraints on the 
aspiring countries’ economic policies. However, some significant factors make the Maastricht 
criteria less of a constraint than initial joining of the EU was.  
 
First, the deadlines for joining the EMU have been somewhat vague and as governments 
have nowhere near complete control over the criteria – especially the inflation – delays are 
understandable. At the same time, there is no strict proscription on all policies that may 
increase inflation and thus possibly delay the introduction of Euro. While successive 
governments have adhered to fiscal discipline and very modest public debt burden, the tax 
policies have not always been anti-inflationary. Thus, despite the imminent threat of 
overheating of economy, successive governments have continued with personal income tax 
cuts even though it adds its share to inflationary pressures.40 While the magnitude of its 
10 
actual effect can be debated, it shows that even if governments may be dedicated to sound 
macroeconomic policies, electoral pressure may lead them to make certain concessions. 
The issue of harmonizing excise taxes to the EU standards is also indicative. The Accession 
Treaty had foreseen a relatively slow timetable for bringing the Estonian excise taxes in line 
with the EU minimums. In 2006, joining the EMU became less and less likely as inflation was 
clearly over the Maastricht reference value and overheating of Estonian economy loomed, 
IMF suggested bringing the increases in excises on fuel, electricity, alcohol, and tobacco 
forward so as to take their inflationary pressure off the years when EMU-compatible inflation 
level would have been possible to attain.41 However, during 2006, the government ruled out 
early increases, only to go forward with them in spring 2007 – evidently after the electoral 
pressure had gone off. There is no reason to believe that the government was not sincerely 
committed to the early introduction of Euro. That objective was simply counterbalanced by 
the fear of very likely backlashes in popularity shortly before parliamentary elections. The 
weak popular support for the introduction of Euro (see Figure 1) did not raise the 
attractiveness of IMF’s proposals.  
 
Remarkably, during the 2007 election campaign, the delay in the introduction of Euro was a 
minor object of debate. Only Taavi Veskimägi – former Minister of Finance and at the time 
chair of RP – criticised the government for not taking the deadlines seriously enough. 
However, the rest of the newly-merged Pro Patria & RP did not echo the criticism. Other 
parties did not much mention of the issue – presumably because of the modest support for 
introduction of the Euro among the population. Also, the inflation level was related to racing 
economic growth and no political party dared to criticise directly the macroeconomic policies 
that had brought it about as they all wished to capitalise on their presumable role in granting 
for instance the 14 per cent average pay rise in 2006.42 
 
The argument may understate the importance of Maastricht criteria in constraining national 
policy options. Indeed, the bringing forward of excise increases can only be explained in 
terms of EMU conditionality and cannot be explained well in terms of national political or 
even economic dynamics. While the range of economic policy options may not narrow if 
inflation becomes much easier to control or Maastricht targets gets unattainable for objective 
reasons, one can reasonably expect the Euro issue to become more prominent in 2011 
parliamentary elections. At the time of writing, 2011 is the new intended deadline and any 
failure will likely be taken into account when assessing government performance by the 
electorate. Even if the support for Euro will not increase significantly the unpopular excise 
increases will seem less justified if it would not be introduced. Even in the eyes of €-skeptics, 
the government may lose credibility if it fails to achieve the set objectives. The conditionality 
is real and the issue of Euro will likely become more stressing -- the above discussion 
merely highlights the fact that such constraints are always mediated by domestic political 
considerations such as timing of elections and popular position on particular issues. 
 
Conclusion 
This article demonstrates the intricate nature of EU membership’s effect on Estonian party 
politics. On one hand, there is certainly something out there. Estonia takes part in European 
decision-making and discussions on the future of the EU. That requires the parties to take a 
stance on European issues at least once in a while. European parliament election with its 
particular electoral system is a new factor shaping patterns of political competition. A new 
stratum of EU politicians has emerged who do not necessarily limit themselves to Brussels 
and may use their high profile for domestic political purposes. All major Estonian parties are 
to some extent engaged in work of Pan-European parties. National policy options are 
constrained by EU common policies and rules for member states – in particular EMU 
membership requirements. The effects may be somewhat fuzzy, but Estonian party politics 
would be different in the absence of the EU. 
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However, there is a second side to the story. Estonian parties and the public are not 
particularly concerned about the EU – its current affairs or its future – reflected by the low 
standing of these issues in party manifestos. The inaugural European parliament elections 
had a record-low turnout, focussed more on the experience of candidates than party 
manifestos and the different pattern of competition there influenced Estonian party system at 
best subtly and temporarily. The Maastricht criteria put constraints on economic policy 
options but parties make good use of the feasible range and may even try to expand it – 
subject to any laxity in the rules and aided by popular ignorance of the issue. Domestic 
political concerns have remained prevalent, and if the EU has had any effects, it is severely 
constrained by the inertia of pre-existing patterns of party competition and parties’ main 
preoccupation with their business in Tallinn rather than Brussels. 
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Tables 
Table 1 Parliamentary and European Parliament Elections in Estonia, 1992-2007 (% votes) 
 
Parliament European 
Parliament 
2004 
Parliament 
1992 1995 1997 2003 2007 
Reform - 16.2 15.9 17.7 12.2 27.8 
Centre 12.2 14.2 23.4 25.4 17.5 26.1 
Union of Pro Patria & RP - - - - - 17.9 
Res Publica - - - 24.6 6.7 - 
Pro Patria 22 7.9 16.1 7.3 10.5 - 
Social Democrats 9.7 6 15.2 7 36.8 10.6 
People’s Union - -a 7.3 13 8 7.1 
Greens 2.6 - - - 2b 7.1 
Coalition Party  13.6 32.2 7.6 - - - 
United People's Partyc - 5.9 6.1 2.2 - 1.0 
National Independence Party 8.8 - - - - - 
Independent Royalists 7.1 0.8 - - - - 
Estonian Citizen/Better Estonia 6.9 3.6 - - - - 
Others 19.7 13.2 6.4 2.6 6.3 2.3 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 
a In electoral coalition with the Coalition Party. 
b Marek Strandberg as an independent candidate. 
c Electoral coalition “Our Home is Estonia!” in 1995, Constitution Party in 2007. 
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Table 2 MEPs and European affiliation of Estonian political parties 
Party MEPsa European affiliationb 
Reform, Centre Toomas Savi (Reform) 
Siiri Oviir (Centre) 
ELDR 
Pro Patria & RP  Tunne Kelam EPP 
Social Democrats Marianne Mikko 
Andres Tarand 
Katrin Saks 
PES 
People’s Union  AEN 
The Greens  EGP 
Left Party  European Left 
Christian Democrats  ECPM 
Independence Party, Constitution Party, 
Russian Party 
 
– 
a as of July 2007. 
b All Europarties are represented in the European Parliament. ECPM is a partial exception, 
as it does not have its own faction but the Dutch ChristenUnie is a member of Ind/Dem 
group. 
 
Table 3 Inflation in Estonia 2002-2006 
Year 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
GDP growth (%) 7.2 8.3 10.2 11.2 7.1 
Inflation (%) 1.3 3.0 4.1 4.4 6.6 
Approximate Maastricht reference 
value (%) 
2.8 2.5 3.0 3.0 3.1 
Sources: World Economic Outlook Database, 
http://imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2008/01/weodata/index.aspx, April 2008. Eurostat HICP 
database, http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/pls/portal/url/page/PGP_DS_HICP (accessed 29 
July 2007).  
Note: Maastricht reference values are approximations by the author, based on the annual 
inflation figure for the third best performing member state plus 1.5%. 
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Figures 
Figure 1 Support for EU membership (% of adult citizens) 
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Sources: EMOR “Euroopa Liidu seire, Märts 2007,” 
http://www.riigikantselei.ee/doc.php?73266, “Eesti elanike suhtumine ühinemisse Euroopa 
Liiduga 2003,” http://www.riigikantselei.ee/?id=5130, “Üle poole kodanikest on euroliidu 
vastu,” http://www.emor.ee/arhiiv.html?id=556, EMOR “Euroopa Liidu seire, november 
2005,” www.riigikantselei.ee/doc.php?6256 (accessed 26 July 2007). 
Note: Support for the introduction of Euro as a percent of adult population. 
 
Figure 2 Voter views on further EU integration, 2003-2007 
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Source: 2004 and 2007 post-election surveys by the Department of Political Science, 
University of Tartu. The exact wording was: “Some say European unification should be 
pushed further. Others think that it has already gone too far. What do you think? On this 
scale, 1 means unification 'has already gone too far' and 10 means it 'should be pushed 
further'. What number on this scale best describes your position?”. 
14 
Notes: 2003 refers to respondent recollections in 2004, whiskers refer to standard deviation 
of the mean. 
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